# Senior Management Gender Composition and Firm performance in Europe 

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## Introduction

- motivation: (Croson \& Gneezy, JEL,09)
- economic experiments find robust gender differences in risk aversion and competitive preferences
- ... may translate into differences in firm performance between men and women-led firms
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- post selection into management/entrepreneurship
- today: data construction, data overview, preliminary shock analysis


## Data construction

- raw data retrieved from annual versions (disks) of Amadeus/Orbis Europe provided by Bureau van Dijk - A Moody's Company
- annual versions of Amadeus (1999-2015) and under its alternative name Orbis Europe (2016-2020)
- time variation in management


## Data construction - Steps

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- from 2005 onwards
- current managers
- firm identifier, manager first and last name, management title, management gender, position, and committee membership
- attribute information to year of version


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6. match with firms' financial information (Merlevede et al. (15); Kalemli et al. (22))

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- availability financial accounts
- unconsolidated accounts
- business economy (NACE 5-82)
- employer firms
- drop firms that never report employees


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- drop firms that never report employees
- 13,029,641 firms; 75,182,724 firm-year obs., 2005-19
- (no full info on all financial items)


## Data Construction: Financial items and data availability

Table: Summary statistics (firm-year observations)

|  | No. | Mean | Stdev. | p25 | Median | p75 |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| \# managers | $75,182,724$ | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| real total assets (log) | $51,041,015$ | 12.4 | 2.2 | 11.0 | 12.5 | 13.9 |
| employees | $52,520,157$ | 10.8 | 26.6 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 7.0 |
| leverage | $36,337,248$ | 0.73 | 0.99 | 0.28 | 0.58 | 0.85 |
| WLP-TFP (log) | $13,634,543$ | 6.0 | 1.2 | 5.3 | 6.1 | 6.8 |

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- across industries between $23 \%$ and $45 \%$


## Data overview

- only $36 \%$ of observations concern firms with at least one female manager ( $64 \%$ of observations are male-only senior management)
- varies more across countries than industries
- across countries between $18 \%$ and $73 \%$
- across industries between $23 \%$ and $45 \%$
- management composition fairly stable over time
- changes in the share of female managers within existing firms above e.g. the $50 \%$ threshold are scarce: $0.8 \%$ of observations


## Female managers as share of total managers across countries

Share of female managers (all observations)


## Share of female managers across countries - at least three managers



Generally higher share of female managers because micro firms with single manager are predominantly male-led

Senior management size and the share of female managers

|  | firms |  |  | share of female managers |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | share | \# |  | $\mathbf{0}$ | $\mathbf{1 - 2 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 6 - 5 0}$ | $\mathbf{5 1 - 9 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0}$ |
| \# managers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 | 62.3 | $46,848,366$ |  | 77.0 |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | 26.3 | $19,741,345$ |  | 45.7 |  | 22.4 |  | 31.9 |
| 3 | 6.9 | $5,198,305$ |  | 40.6 |  | 19.8 | 15.3 | 24.3 |
| 4 | 2.5 | $1,878,552$ |  | 33.5 | 18.8 | 13.9 | 11.7 | 22.1 |
| $5-10$ | 1.9 | $1,400,226$ |  | 29.1 | 22.7 | 19.3 | 18.6 | 10.3 |
| $>10$ | 0.2 | 115,930 |  | 12.3 | 46.9 | 30.6 | 9.8 | 0.5 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 100.0 | $75,182,724$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Firm size and the share of female managers

|  | firms |  | share of female managers |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | share | \# | 0 | 1-25 | 26-50 | 51-99 | 100 |
| firm size |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| micro | 80.8 | 42,449,524 | 67.0 | 0.5 | 7.3 | 1.1 | 24.1 |
| small | 14.8 | 7,787,390 | 64.9 | 2.2 | 9.8 | 3.0 | 20.1 |
| medium | 3.6 | 1,900,598 | 60.5 | 6.2 | 13.7 | 4.8 | 14.7 |
| large | 0.7 | 382,645 | 58.2 | 12.5 | 16.1 | 4.3 | 8.8 |
| Total | 100.0 | 52,520,157 |  |  |  |  |  |

## Senior management size and firm size

|  | firms |  |  | firm size |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
|  | share | $\#$ |  | micro | small | medium | large |  |
| \# managers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 | 65.3 | $34,286,151$ |  | 86.4 | 11.3 | 2.0 | 0.3 |  |
| 2 | 23.6 | $12,390,419$ |  | 77.5 | 17.9 | 3.9 | 0.7 |  |
| 3 | 6.6 | $3,440,104$ |  | 63.1 | 26.7 | 8.5 | 1.7 |  |
| 4 | 2.4 | $1,270,203$ |  | 52.3 | 31.7 | 13.1 | 3.0 |  |
| $5-10$ | 2.0 | $1,034,782$ |  | 36.2 | 34.4 | 22.6 | 6.8 |  |
| $>10$ | 0.2 | 98,498 |  | 19.9 | 27.9 | 30.5 | 21.7 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 19.3 | $52,520,157$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Share of female managers across industries



## Firm outcomes and senior management gender composition

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- given limited variation within firms in terms of gender composition compare male and female-led firms within tight country-4-digit-industry-year combinations:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { outcome }_{i j c t}=\beta_{1} \text { female }_{i j c t}+\beta_{2} \text { controls }_{i j c t}+\delta_{j c t}+\epsilon_{i j c t} \tag{1}
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- dummy variable for female-led firms (at least $50 \%$ female managers)
- little difference between different thresholds
- focus on SMEs with between 10 and 250 employees
- estimation sample 9,681,259 observations on management
- on average 2.1 managers/firm out of which 0.63 are female


## Real outcomes

|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ | $(5)$ | $(6)$ | $(7)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | TA | L | K | Y | RevEff | TFP | W |
| female | $-0.111^{* * *}$ | $-0.038^{* * *}$ | $-0.006^{*}$ | $-0.033^{* * *}$ | $-0.031^{* * *}$ | $-0.025^{* * *}$ | $-0.020^{* * *}$ |
|  | $[0.002]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.003]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.001]$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| foreign | $0.781^{* * *}$ | $0.282^{* * *}$ | $0.328^{* * *}$ | $0.195^{* * *}$ | $0.189^{* * *}$ | $0.256^{* * *}$ | $0.243^{* * *}$ |
|  | $[0.004]$ | $[0.003]$ | $[0.007]$ | $[0.003]$ | $[0.003]$ | $[0.003]$ | $[0.002]$ |
| age | $0.383^{* * *}$ | $0.134^{* * *}$ | $0.454^{* * *}$ | $-0.070^{* * *}$ | $-0.062^{* * *}$ | $-0.076^{* * *}$ | $0.020^{* * *}$ |
|  | $[0.001]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.002]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.001]$ |
| size |  |  |  | $0.712^{* * *}$ | $0.357^{* * *}$ | $0.307^{* * *}$ | $0.135^{* * *}$ |
|  |  |  |  | $[0.001]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.000]$ |
| listed | $1.138^{* * *}$ | $0.411^{* * *}$ | $1.241^{* * *}$ | $-0.437^{* * *}$ | $-0.427^{* * *}$ | $-0.273^{* * *}$ | $0.069^{* * *}$ |
|  | $[0.040]$ | $[0.026]$ | $[0.051]$ | $[0.033]$ | $[0.028]$ | $[0.026]$ | $[0.014]$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| obs. | $8,246,451$ | $9,629,265$ | $7,921,914$ | $4,921,122$ | $4,921,122$ | $3,195,927$ | $4,249,804$ |
| R-sq. | 0.422 | 0.172 | 0.306 | 0.781 | 0.681 | 0.732 | 0.831 |
| C-I-Y FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |

## Real outcomes - Senior management size

|  | TA | L | K | Y | RevEff | TFP | W |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Single manager SME |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| female | $\begin{gathered} -0.106^{* * *} \\ {[0.003]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.024^{* * *} \\ {[0.002]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.064^{* * *} \\ {[0.005]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.021^{* * *} \\ {[0.002]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.024^{* * *} \\ {[0.002]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.012 * * * \\ {[0.002]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.009 * * * \\ {[0.001]} \end{gathered}$ |
| obs. | 3,672,609 | 4,506,941 | 3,502,129 | 2,105,320 | 2,105,320 | 1,397,324 | 1,690,731 |
| R-sq. | 0.422 | 0.192 | 0.302 | 0.770 | 0.703 | 0.730 | 0.853 |
|  | At least two manager SME |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| female | $\begin{gathered} -0.198 * * * \\ {[0.003]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.097 * * * \\ {[0.002]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.054^{* * *} \\ {[0.004]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.056^{* * *} \\ {[0.002]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.038 * * * \\ {[0.002]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.043 * * * \\ {[0.002]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.035^{* * *} \\ {[0.001]} \end{gathered}$ |
| obs. | 4,546,377 | 5,093,800 | 4,392,184 | 2,789,184 | 2,789,184 | 1,778,922 | 2,535,533 |
| R-sq. | 0.414 | 0.187 | 0.313 | 0.781 | 0.658 | 0.729 | 0.794 |
| controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| C-I-Y FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |

## Financial outcomes

|  | (1) <br> leverage | leverage |  | $(4)$ <br> current | (5) solvency | (6) <br> RoA | (7) profit |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | financial | non-fin. | ratio |  |  | margin |
| female | $\begin{gathered} -0.023 * * * \\ {[0.001]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.002 * * * \\ {[0.000]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.023 * * * \\ {[0.001]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.092^{* * *} \\ {[0.007]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.019 * * \\ {[0.008]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.385 * * * \\ {[0.026]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.005 * * * \\ {[0.000]} \end{gathered}$ |
| obs. | 5,508,004 | 4,799,692 | 4,799,692 | 5,675,120 | 2,682,674 | 4,519,116 | 3,726,598 |
| R-sq. | 0.129 | 0.189 | 0.197 | 0.171 | 0.089 | 0.086 | 0.096 |
| controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| C-I-Y FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |

## Financial outcomes - Senior management size

|  | leverage | leverage |  | current | solvency | RoA | profit <br> financial <br>  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| non-fin. | ratio |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Risk aversion, decision making, and response to shocks

## Risk aversion, decision making, and response to shocks

- Croson \& Gneezy (JEL09): gender differences in risk aversion
- use data in contexts where risk aversion is more likely to play a role
- preliminary results on
- export decision (Melitz (03): sunk cost)
- import competition (mimic Bloom et al. (15))
- uncertainty shocks (Baker et al. (16))


## Decision making: Exporting (FR, HR, GR)

|  | (1) |  | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | exporter |  | export volume |  | export share |  |
| female | 0.016* | 0.016* | 0.143 | 0.148 | -0.536 | -0.529 |
|  | [0.008] | [0.008] | [0.108] | [0.108] | [0.489] | [0.489] |
| leverage $_{t-1}$ |  | -0.003 |  | 0.171 |  | 0.210 |
|  |  | [0.009] |  | [0.119] |  | [0.659] |
| size | 0.087*** | 0.087*** | 1.685*** | 1.687*** | 4.299*** | 4.300*** |
|  | [0.004] | [0.004] | [0.053] | [0.053] | [0.276] | [0.275] |
| TFP | 0.045*** | 0.045*** | 0.945*** | 0.954*** | 3.269*** | 3.281*** |
|  | [0.008] | [0.008] | [0.103] | [0.103] | [0.526] | [0.526] |
| Observations | 57,419 | 57,408 | 57,419 | 57,408 | 57,419 | 57,408 |
| R-squared | 0.290 | 0.290 | 0.377 | 0.377 | 0.332 | 0.332 |
| C-I-Y FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |

## Import shocks (manufacturing)

|  | Y | L | RevEff. | TFP | K | W |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | three year growth |  |  |  |  |  |
| shock $\times$ fem | $-0.021^{* *}$ | -0.005 | $-0.010^{*}$ | -0.005 | 0.010 | -0.006 |
|  | $[0.009]$ | $[0.006]$ | $[0.006]$ | $[0.006]$ | $[0.010]$ | $[0.004]$ |
| female | $0.034^{* * *}$ | $0.014^{* * *}$ | 0.007 | 0.007 | $-0.017^{*}$ | $0.006^{*}$ |
|  | $[0.008]$ | $[0.005]$ | $[0.005]$ | $[0.005]$ | $[0.010]$ | $[0.004]$ |
| leverage | -0.025 | 0.000 | 0.002 | $0.037^{* * *}$ | $-0.036^{* * *}$ | $-0.013^{* * *}$ |
|  | $[0.016]$ | $[0.000]$ | $[0.004]$ | $[0.008]$ | $[0.012]$ | $[0.001]$ |
| Observations | 232,560 | 274,860 | 221,077 | 162,138 | 194,785 | 196,485 |
| R-squared | 0.107 | 0.086 | 0.104 | 0.143 | 0.073 | 0.116 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| C-I-Y FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |

## Uncertainty shocks (DE, FR, IT, GB, ES)

|  | Y | L | RevEff. | TFP | K | W |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | three year growth |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| shock $\times$ fem | -0.023 | -0.005 | -0.005 | $-0.011^{* *}$ | $-0.027^{* * *}$ | $-0.005^{*}$ |  |
|  | $[0.017]$ | $[0.005]$ | $[0.005]$ | $[0.005]$ | $[0.009]$ | $[0.003]$ |  |
| female | 0.118 | 0.029 | 0.021 | $0.052^{*}$ | $0.135^{* * *}$ | 0.024 |  |
|  | $[0.085]$ | $[0.024]$ | $[0.027]$ | $[0.027]$ | $[0.047]$ | $[0.015]$ |  |
| leverage | $-0.000^{* *}$ | $-0.000^{* * *}$ | 0.000 | $0.005^{* * *}$ | $-0.011^{* *}$ | -0.000 |  |
|  | $[0.000]$ | $[0.000]$ | $[0.000]$ | $[0.002]$ | $[0.005]$ | $[0.000]$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | $1,663,990$ | $2,276,897$ | $1,595,927$ | 979,950 | $1,212,144$ | $1,285,687$ |  |
| R-squared | 0.064 | 0.035 | 0.044 | 0.068 | 0.039 | 0.052 |  |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |  |
| C-I-M-Y FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |  |

## Summary

- Build large firm-level dataset to analyze the evolution of gender differences in risky firm decision-making
- 75 m observations on 13 m firms
- 26 European countries, business economy, 2005-2019
- only $36 \%$ firms with at least one female manager
- varies more across countries than industries
- gender composition within firms is fairly stable
- within tight country-industry-year cells women-led SMEs
- have lower leverage, are smaller and less productive
- do not differ in terms of exporting behavior and response to import shocks
- indication of lower TFP and investment growth in very uncertain environments, but higher growth in environments characterized by low uncertainty

